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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(a) and (j), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal is taken
from an Order of the Utah Labor Commission denying RESPONDENTS' Motion for Review,
which was then appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.) Whether the "coming and going" doctrine is applicable to the facts in this case. The
"coming and going" doctrine defines whether an employee injured on the way to or coming from
work is acting within the course and scope of employment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the "coming and going" doctrine applies to the
facts of this case is a mixed question of law and fact and, as such, this Court reviews "a trial
court's or agency's application of the law to the facts . . . with varying degrees of strictness,
falling anywhere between a review of 'correctness' and a broad 'abuse of discretion' standard."
Drake v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997), quoting Langeland v. Monarch
Motors, Inc., 307 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4, — P.2d —, — (Utah Dec. 31, 1996), citing State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936-939 (Utah 1994).
PRESERVATION ON APPEAL: On July 17, 2003, RESPONDENTS filed their
Motion for Review with the Labor Commission. (Motion for Review, R. 44). RESPONDENTS
argued that the Commission did not correctly apply the "coming and going" doctrine to the facts
of this case and asked the Labor Commission to overturn Judge George's decision.
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Respondent's Motion for Review, R. 47-56).

3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: PETITIONER filed an Application for Hearing requesting
Temporary Total Disability Benefits from August 1, 2000 through June 11, 2001, Medical
Expenses, Travel Expenses, and Interest. (Application for Hearing, R. 1). An accident occurred
while PETITIONER was on his way to work. There is a question of whether the accident
occurred within the course and scope of employment.
Course of Proceedings: On June 11, 2001, at 10:00 a.m., a hearing was held before the
Honorable Judge Donald L. George regarding the compensability of PETITIONER'S injuries and
whether the accident occurred within the course and scope of PETITIONER'S employment.
(Notice of Formal Hearing on Application for Adjustment of Claim, R. 16; Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order, R. 37-43).

On June 6, 2003, Judge George issued a

memorandum decision in which he found that PETITIONER'S automobile accident was an
accident that arose out of the course and scope of employment and, therefore, was a compensable
accident. (Memorandum Decision, R.32-34). Judge George then asked that Ms. K. Dawn Atkin,
counsel for PETITIONER, draft the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and submit them
to his office. (Memorandum Decision, R. 32-34). On June 17, 2003, Judge George issued his
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, ordering RESPONDENTS to pay temporary
total benefits, past and future medical expenses, and attorney fees.

(Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law, and Order, R. 37-43).
On July 17, 2003, RESPONDENTS filed their Motion for Review with the Labor
Commission. (Motion for Review, R. 44-46). RESPONDENTS argued that the Commission did
not correctly apply the "coming and going" doctrine to the facts of this case and asked the Labor
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Commission to overturn Judge George's decision. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Respondents' Motion for Review, R. 47-56).
On November 6, 2003, the Labor Commission entered its Order Denying Motion for
Review and upheld Judge George's award of benefits as a compensable accident, ignoring the
coming and going rule and holding that the accident occurred within the course and scope of
PETITIONER'S employment. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 66-70). On December 1,
2003, RESPONDENTS filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals. (Petition for
Review, R. 71-72).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 1, 2000, PETITIONER was employed as an assistant manager by
RESPONDENTS, a small company that sold hydro-massage products from kiosks located in
Fashion Place, Cottonwood, and Crossroads malls. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 66).
The Labor Commission found that as assistant manager, PETITIONER was expected to take
whatever action was necessary to make RESPONDENTS' retail operations run smoothly. (Order
Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). PETITIONER established employee work schedules and
called employees from his home to verify they would report for work. (Order Denying Motion
for Review, R. 67). Occasionally, PETITIONER worked at various sales kiosks himself, as
necessary to cover for absent employees.

(Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67).

PETITIONER collected employee time cards, tracked inventory, and collected and deposited
sales receipts.

(Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). The Labor Commission also

determined that PETITIONER used his personal vehicle to deliver product he needed to deliver
to the various mall locations on any given day. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67).

5
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On August 1, 2000, PETITIONER made an entry on his family home computer at 7:30
a.m. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). PETITIONER was scheduled to work at a
kiosk in Fashion Place Mall at 10:00 a.m. and was proceeding there when he was involved in a
motor vehicle accident at 9:47 a.m. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Because on the morning of the accident PETITIONER was leaving for his regularly
scheduled shift, PETITIONER was not within the course and scope of his employment.
PETITIONER should be treated as any other employee who is leaving their home to begin
working a shift for any employer. Although PETITIONER'S job description included delivering
products from his home to various area mall locations, travel between mall locations, and other
delivers such as deposit receipts, determining whether the PETITIONER was within the course
and scope of employment is not based on a person's general duties. Instead, the Court must
determine what the PETITIONER activities were on the morning of the accident and at the time
of the accident.
In this case, the PETITIONER'S general job duties required the use of his personal
vehicle and travel between mall locations to deliver products. PETITIONER'S duty on the
morning of the accident, at the time of his departure, was to open the kiosk in Fashion Place Mall
for his regularly scheduled shift. RESPONDENTS had no control over PETITIONER while he
traveled from his home to the Fashion Place Mall and received no benefit from his arrival at the
kiosk. Consequently, the PETITIONER was not within the course and scope of his employment
at the time of the accident and, therefore, benefits should be denied pursuant to the coming and
going rule.

6
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ARGUMENTS
I.

PETITIONER WAS ON HIS WAY TO COVER AN OPENING SHIFT AT
THE FASHION PLACE MALL KIOSK AND, THEREFORE, THE GOING
AND COMING APPLIES TO THE FACTS IN THIS CASE

The Labor Commission (hereinafter referred to as the "Commission") ruled that the
"coming and going" doctrine is "inapplicable when the travel which gives rise to the accident is
an integral part of the work itself." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Specifically, in
denying RESPONDENTS' Motion for Review, the Commission determined that it was
PETITIONER'S "duty to transport merchandise from his home to [RESPONDENTS'] store
locations, to travel between the sales, locations, and to travel for other business purposes such as
depositing sales receipts." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Based upon these duties,
the Commission found that PETITIONER'S "work-related travel was, therefore, the 'condition'
out of which his accident and injury arose." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68).
Consequently, the Commission determined that PETITIONER'S injuries occurred within the
course and scope of his employment and benefits should be paid. (Order Denying Motion for
Review, R. 69).
Furthermore, the Commission determined that PETITIONER'S "automobile accident
occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer, or at the very least was engaged in an
activity that was necessarily incidental to his employment." (Order Denying Motion for Review,
R. 68). Accordingly, the Commission determined that PETITIONER'S injuries "arose out of and
in the course of [PETITIONER'S] employment. . ." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68).
A review of the court-crafted coming and going rule, however, will show that the facts as
presented in this case do not except the PETITIONER'S travel to the Fashion Place Mall from
the traditional coming and going rule.

7
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Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-401(l), an employee who is injured by an
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, shall
be paid compensation. As it is not always clear what actions should be deemed to be "arising out
of and in the course of employment, however, Utah courts have wisely offered guidelines in
making this determination. Otherwise, it would be arguable that any action, even those that are
tangentially related to an employee's work-related duties, would be deemed to be "arising out of
and in the course of employment.
In addressing whether an employee traveling to and from work is covered under the
above-referenced statute, Utah courts have consistently held that "[a]s a general rule, injuries
sustained by an employee while traveling to and from the place of employment do not arise out
of and in the course of employment and are, therefore, not covered by workers' compensation.
VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n, 901 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also, State Tax
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); Cross v. Industrial Comm'n,
814 P.2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Court, dealing with issues of equity and
fairness, held that "it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its
employees over which it has no control and from which it derives no benefit." VanLeeuwen, 901
P.2d at 284. Furthermore, while it is critical and beneficial to an employer that his employee
actually show up for work, "mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit to the
employer." Id. at 285, see also, Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber, 465 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1970).
In explaining the reasoning behind these holdings, the Utah Supreme Court, quoting 82
Am. Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 296 (1992), noted that "[t]his general coming and going
rule arose because, in most instances, such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and
hazards to which all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards
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having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer." Drake v. Industrial
Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah 1997).
The Commission concluded that "travel was an essential part of [PETITIONER'S]
employment" and that PETITIONER'S "work-related travel was, therefore, the 'condition' out of
which his accident and injury arose." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Accordingly,
the Commission determined that "the coming and going rule is inapplicable when the travel
which gives rise to the accident is an integral part of the work itself." (Order Denying Motion
for Review, R. 68) The mere fact that the Commission found PETITIONER'S vehicle to be an
essential part of his employment, however, does not mean that PETITIONER suffered a
compensable accident.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that even though the injured party's vehicle
may be an essential part of their employment, the use of the employee's vehicle is not
dispositive. In Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Company ("VALIC"), 801 P.2d
934 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the employee was acting within
the course and scope of employment when he was required to use his personal vehicle for
business purposes. In VALIC, the employee was a district manager and sales person for VALIC.
Id. at 935. VALIC required him to supervise salesmen and to market annuities and, to this end,
VALIC provided the employee with an office, telephone, telex machine, and full time office
personnel. Id. The employee used his personal vehicle "to commute to and from work and for
sales calls during the day." Id. Additionally, the employee would "occasionally made sales calls
on his way home and made phone calls to clients from his home." Id.
On the day of the accident, the employee left his work to return home, where he intended
to make sales calls. Id. The Court found that the employee had no appointments between his

9
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work and his home. Id. On the way home, employee was involved in a motor vehicle accident
which resulted in serious injuries to the other driver of the vehicle. Id.
The Court found that the employee worked regular hours, "had a fixed office where the
bulk of his work was performed . . . [and] frequently left the office for sales calls or meetings . .
." Id. at 937 Despite these general duties, the Court considered the employee's activities at the
time of the accident. Id. At the time of the accident, the employee "was not on a sales call, an
errand, or a special mission for his employer." Id. Furthermore, the Court recognized that at the
time of the accident VALIC had "no control over [employee] 's decision to commute to and from
work, the route he chose, or the manner in which he drove his automobile." Id.

More

importantly, the employee's frequent use of his personal vehicle for business purposes did "not
make VALIC liable for all accidents [petitioner] may be involved in." Id. Accordingly, because
the employee's activity did not benefit the employer, the Court ruled that the employee was not
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
In this case, as in VALIC, PETITIONER was frequently required to use his vehicle for
business purposes. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). The PETITIONER, as in
VALIC, would often place calls from various locations and was required to travel to various
business locations. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). In VALIC, the employee had
finished conducting some of his employment duties at the office and left for home intending to
conduct more business telephone calls when he was involved in a car accident. In this case,
PETITIONER had finished conducting business at his home and was traveling to the Fashion
Place Mall kiosk intending to work his regularly scheduled shift when he was involved in a car
accident. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). In both cases, at the time of the car
accident neither the VALIC employee nor the PETITIONER were providing a benefit to their
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respective employers and, therefore, PETITIONER car accident did not occur within the course
and scope of his employment and the accident is not compensable.
Similarly, in Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber, 24 Utah 2d 16, 465 P.2d 175 (1970), the Utah
Supreme Court addressed the fact that an employee was killed on the way to work to attend a
meeting with company personnel at the company office. Id. at 175. The employee worked with
and supervised the company's sales personnel. Id. The employee's work "required extensive
use of an automobile both during and after normal working hours." Id. On the morning of the
accident, the employee left his house on his way to attend a mandatory meeting at the company
offices when he was struck and killed by a train. Id.
In response to the petitioner's claims that the coming and going rule did not apply
because the employee was traveling to a mandatory meeting, the Court determined that the
employee must have been performing a duty for the benefit of the employer. In the alternative,
the Court stated that the employee could also have been performing a duty "so connected with
his employment as to be an essential part thereof. . ." Id. at 176. Upon this basis, the Court
determined that the mandatory meeting "was not an unusual occurrence so that traveling to it
was a special assignment or mission for the employer . . . " Id.
Likewise, the Court determined that the employee's use of his personal vehicle in going
to the meeting was not an essential aspect of the business such that it could be regarded as an
integral part of the business and except his case from the coming and going rule. Id. The Court
made this determination despite the fact that the employee was required to travel extensively to
work with and supervise sales representatives and attend mandatory meetings. Accordingly, the
fact that an employee's car is an integral part of his employment duties is not dispositive. The
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benefit to the employer must be quantified as well as the employee's purpose for traveling on the
day of the accident.
In the instant case, the Commission concluded that PETITIONER'S travel was an
essential part of his employment and a condition out of which his injury arose. (Order Denying
Motion for Review, R. 68). The Commission also concluded that PETITIONER'S motor vehicle
accident occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer or, at the very least, engaged
in an activity incidental to his employment. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). The
Commission's decision was based on its conclusion that PETITIONER'S job duties included a
"duty to transport merchandise from his home to [RESPONDENTS'] sales locations, to travel
between the sales locations, and to travel for other business purposes such as depositing sales
receipts." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68).
Although the Commission found that PETITIONER'S travel was essential part of his
employment, the fact that driving is an integral part of an employee's duties is not dispositive.
Instead, as in Lundberg, the benefits to the employer must be weighed as well as the employee's
purpose for traveling on the date of the accident. If the travel on the date of the accident was
routine or not essential to the employee's employment, then the motor vehicle accident is not a
compensable accident.
In the instant case, the Commission made a finding of fact that on the date of
PETITIONER'S motor vehicle accident, PETITIONER drove "to Fashion Place Mall, where he
planned to work [RESPONDENTS'] sales kiosk." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68).
PETITIONER was scheduled to work at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk because the person that
was supposed to have worked that morning had school and could not work that morning.
(Hearing Transcript, pg. 85 pg 101). PETITIONER was to work the kiosk in the place of the
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regular employee. [[Regardless of the events that transpired prior to his departure to work at the
mall kiosk, when he left his home on August 1, 2000, PETITIONER left his house as an
employee on his way to his scheduled shift.]]
On the morning of the accident, PETITIONER was traveling to Fashion Place Mall to
begin a scheduled shift. Again, while it is critical and beneficial to an employer that their
employee actually show up for work, "mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial benefit
to the employer." VanLeeuwen v. Indus. Comm'n, 901 P.2d at 285. As a mere employee
heading to a shift on the morning of the accident there was no substantial benefit to be gained by
the employer. Accordingly, weighing the reason for PETITIONER'S departure on August 1,
2000, PETITIONER left for Fashion Place Mall as a scheduled employee to cover a shift at the
mall kiosk.
As in Lundberg, PETITIONER was required to arrive at the Fashion Place Mall pursuant
to his work schedule. Although PETITIONER'S job required him to drive between locations and
restock product, on the morning of August 1, 2000, PETITIONER left his home as any other
employee on his way to work. PETITIONER was not running company errands, nor was he on a
special mission for his employer; instead, he was on his way to work because he was scheduled
to work at 10:00 a.m. on August 1, 2000. Accordingly, the coming and going rule should be
applied in this case because the injury suffered was a "consequence of risks and hazards to which
all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards having to do with
and originating in the work or business of the employer." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d
177, 182 (Utah 1997).
Likewise, in VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Commission, 901 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1995),
the Utah Court of Appeals similarly held that the employee's injuries did not arise out of and in
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the course of employment. Id. at 285. In VanLeeuwen, the employee sustained injuries in an
automobile accident while driving from his home to the business office. Id. at 283. The injured
employee was a "Project Supervisor" responsible for "supervising other employees and for
transporting them to and from various worksites." Id. The employee was provided a company
truck to carry out his job duties at the various cites he was required to oversee. Id.
The Utah Court of Appeals determined that "as a general rule, injuries sustained by an
employee while traveling to and from the place of employment do not arise out of and in the
course of employment and are, therefore, not covered by workers' compensation." Id. at 284.
The Court determined that the employee "was not performing any service arising out of and in
the course of his employment on the morning of the accident." Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
Moreover, "at the time of the accident, [the employee] was merely traveling to work . . . [h]e had
not yet arrived at work to receive his daily assignments after which he would be under the
control of [the employer]." Id. (emphasis added).

Finally, the Court concluded that the

employer's "control over [the employee] was no greater than its control over any other employee
traveling to and from work." Id.
In this case, as in VanLeeuwen, PETITIONER'S vehicle was a necessary tool to his
employment. Instead of transporting men iErom various job locations, PETITIONER transported
merchandise to the various store locations, traveled between store locations, and traveled for
other business purposes such as depositing sales receipts. (Order Denying Motion for Review,
R. 68). As in VanLeeuwen, PETITIONER regularly traveled between his home and the various
store locations as a regular job duty. On the morning of the accident, however, PETITIONER'S
situation is strikingly similar to the petitioner in VanLeeuwen,
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In VanLeeuwen, the petitioner was on his way from his home to an office location to
receive instructions for the day; PETITIONER was on his way from his home to his business
kiosk as a regular employee with a regular shift. The Court made the distinction between what
the petitioner's regular job duties were and what the petitioner was doing on the morning of the
accident. No such distinction was made by the Commission. (Order Denying Motion for
Review, R. 66-69). The Commission noted that the coming and going rule applies to employees
having fixed hours and place of work and that the coming and going rule is covered only on the
employer's premises. (Order Denying Motion for Review n.l, R.68). On the morning of the
accident, however, PETITIONER left his home because he had a set schedule and a time to work
at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk and, therefore, the coming and going rule should apply in this
case.
In this case, the Commission determined that the coming and going rule did not apply
based on the Commission's findings that PETITIONER would deliver merchandise he received
at his home to the various mall locations. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). The
Commission found that RESPONDENTS had provided PETITIONER with a computer for his
home to do scheduling and to generate reports. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). The
Commission also found that RESPONDENTS had provided him with a cell phone for business
uses while traveling between his home and the various mall locations. (Order Denying Motion
for Review, R. 67). Similarly, the Commission found that PETITIONER
customarily began work at his home at approximately 8 a.m. . . . [h]e would first perform
work on his computer, then call the employees scheduled to work that day . . . [a]t about
9:00 a.m., he would leave his home in the Tooele area and drive to one of
[RESPONDENTS'] sales locations in the Salt Lake Valley.
(Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67).
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Based upon PETITIONER'S work from home prior to his leaving to his scheduled shift at
the Fashion Place Mall kiosk, the Commission concluded that PETITIONER was "rendering a
service to his employer, or at the very least was engaged in an activity that was necessarily
incidental to his employment." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). Based on the
findings of fact, the Commission determined that on the morning of the accident PETITIONER
had logged on to his computer at 7:30 a.m., while his accident occurred at 9:47 a.m. Based upon
these facts, the Commission determined that the coming and going rule did not apply and
workers' compensation benefits were to be paid. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 69).
With respect to the use of the computer, even if it was used for employment purposes and
the PETITIONER actually made work-related phone calls that morning, these actions are hardly
sufficient to conclude that he was at work when he later departed for the mall. To allow such
limited actions to constitute the beginning of the work day for purposes of determining whether
the employee was within the course and scope of his employment with respect to workers'
compensation coverage would have far reaching and negative consequences.
In this day, it is becomingly increasingly rare to find an individual, let alone a business
person, without a cell phone. Add to that, the large number of people who carry a palm pilot or a
lap top computer and you have a population that is largely wired together and to their places of
employment. These connections are necessary due to realities of modern business which often
requires communication between employee and employer at any given time.

While this

technology has made communication easy and almost instantaneous, it has also blurred the line
between when we are at work and when we are outside the control of employers.
Cellular phone calls from clients, co-workers and bosses frequently occur outside of
"normal" work hours. E-mails are sent and checked on lap tops, by text messaging on phones
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and through palm pilots at all hours of the day and night. In fact, staying connected has become
so important that even shopping malls now have internet kiosks where our e-mails can be
checked and responded to while we shop.
Under the reasoning of this case, each time an employee calls ahead to his secretary he is
at work. Each time an email from an employer is checked at a mall kiosk, that person is at work.
Each time an employee sits at his breakfast table and updates his palm pilot with a list of duties
that need to be performed that day, he is at work. Then, if any of these people, pursuant to this
holding, get in an accident on their drive to the office, they are within the course and scope of
their employment.
For many companies, this would mean that their employees now have almost around the
clock workers' compensation coverage.

Even though the benefit to the employer may be

minimal and the control over the employee is virtually nonexistent, these communications that
are so necessary in the modern workplace would be within the course and scope of employment
and would be covered under workers1 compensation. The effects of this blanket coverage would
be chilling to the Utah business climate.
Employers would think twice before making any type of communication with their
employees away from the office. Important deals, decisions that need to be made immediately
and opportunities would have to be bypassed or delayed so as to not expose the employer to
significant liability without any corresponding control over the employees' actions.

Such

limitations certainly go beyond the scope and design of the workers' compensation system.
In sum, the Commission concluded that workers' compensation benefits were owed
because PETITIONER'S duties included a "duty to transport merchandise from his home to
[RESPONDENTS'] sales locations, to travel between sales locations, and to travel for other
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business purposes such as depositing sales receipts." (Order Denying Motion for Review, R.
68). Upon this basis, the Commission concluded that PETITIONER'S accident occurred within
the course and scope of his employment and, consequently, was a compensable accident. (Order
Denying Motion for Review, R. 69).
Based upon PETITIONER making one entry on the family home computer two hours
prior to his departure for his scheduled shift and the PETITIONER'S general duties, the
Commission concluded that PETITIONER'S work-related travel was a condition out of which
his accident arose. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 68). The Commission also concluded
that PETITIONER'S accident "occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer, or at
the very least was engaged in an activity that was necessarily incidental to his employment,"
which was based on PETITIONER'S activities prior to leaving his home. (Order Denying
Motion for Review, R. 68). The Commission considered PETITIONER'S overall job duties and
early morning activity, but did not consider PETITIONER'S activity at the time he left his home
for his regularly scheduled shift on the morning of the accident.
On the morning of the accident, PETITIONER was scheduled to work a shift at the
Fashion Place Mall kiosk. (Hearing Transcript, R. 74, Page 85, Line 10 through Line 20).
Although PETITIONER had made an entry on his family home computer, this entry was made at
7:30 a.m. (Order Denying Motion for Review, R. 67). When PETITIONER left his home for
the Fashion Place Mall kiosk, PETITIONIER was going to the Fashion Place Mall kiosk as any
other employee would when they were scheduled to open that particular location. (Hearing
Transcript, R. 74, Page 93, Line 24 through Page 94, Line 4). Moreover, it should be noted that
RESPONDENTS had no control over PETITIONER'S decision to commute to and from work,
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the route he chose, or the manner in which PETITIONER drove his vehicle.

(Hearing

Transcript, R. 74, Page 93, Line 4 through Page 94, Line 4).
The Commission based the award of workers' compensation benefits on PETITIONER'S
overall job duties rather than what the PETITIONER was scheduled to do at the time he left his
home on the morning of the accident. Consequently, benefits should be denied based on the
coming and going rule as PETITIONER was merely traveling from his home to his scheduled
shift at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk, which is not within the course and scope of his
employment.
CONCLUSION
Although PETITIONER made an entry on his home computer and may have conducted
other business activity, the fact remains that when he left his home in Tooele he was leaving his
home to attend his regularly scheduled shift at the Fashion Place Mall kiosk. RESPONDENTS
neither had control over PETITIONER nor received any benefit from his arrival at work.
Consequently, the RESPONDENTS respectfully request this Court reverse the Commission's
Order Denying Motion for Review and deny the award of workers' compensation benefits under
the coming and going rule.
DATED THIS Zf

day of May, 2004.
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL

Attorneys for Respondents/Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, an addendum in
included herewith.
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78-2-7
78-2-7.

JUDICIAL CODE
Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986,1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.
78-2a-6.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records
and information — Governmental immunity.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
1986

78-2a-2.

N u m b e r of j u d g e s — Terms — F u n c t i o n s —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and t h e Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988

546

(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals h a s appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the U t a h Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
2001
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
1986
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state.
1986

78-2a-6. Appellate Mediation Office — Protected
records and information — Governmental ini"
munity.
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pursuant to Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b), information and records
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the
Chief Appellate Mediator or other staff of the Appellate
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex- Mediation Office as a result of any party's participation or lack
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary: of participation in the settlement program shall be main(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de- tained as protected records pursuant to Subsections 63-2(17),J. (18),
andClark
(33).Law School, BYU.
crees; or
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UTAH LABOR CODE

34A-2-401

(c) (i) Except as provided in Subsections (4)(c)(ii) and
(iii), if a chemical test that creates the presumption
under Subsection (4)(a) is taken at the request of the
employer, the employer shall comply with:
(A) Title 34, Chapter 38, Drug and Alcohol
Testing; or
(B) if the employee is a local governmental
employee or an employee of a state institution of
higher education, Title 34, Chapter 41, Local
Governmental Entity Drug-Free Workplace Policies.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34-38-13, the results
of a test taken under Title 34, Chapter 38, may be
disclosed to the extent necessary to establish or rebut
the presumption created under Subsection (4)(a).
(iii) Notwithstanding Section 34-41-103, the results of a test taken under Title 34, Chapter 41, may
be disclosed to the extent necessary to establish or
rebut the presumption created under Subsection
(4)(a).
(5) If any provision of this section, or the application of any
provision of this section to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.
2000
PART 4
COMPENSATION AND B E N E F I T S
34A-2-401. C o m p e n s a t i o n for i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t s to
be paid.
(1) An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid:
(a) compensation for loss sustained on account of the
injury or death;
(b) the amount provided in this chapter for:
(i) medical, nurse, and hospital services;
(ii) medicines; and
(iii) in case of death, the amount of funeral expenses.
(2) The responsibility for compensation and payment of
medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and
funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be:
(a) on the employer and the employer's insurance carrier; and
(b) not on the employee.
(3) Payment of benefits provided by this chapter or Chapter
3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, shall commence within 30
calendar days after any final award by the commission.
1999
34A-2-402. M e n t a l s t r e s s claims.
(1) Physical, mental, or emotional injuries related to mental stress arising out of and in the course of employment shall
be compensable under this chapter only when there is a
sufficient legal and medical causal connection between the
employee's injury and employment.
(2) (a) Legal causation requires proof of extraordinary
mental stress from a sudden stimulus arising predominantly and directly from employment.
(b) The extraordinary and sudden nature of the alleged
mental stress is judged according to an objective standard
in comparison with contemporary national employment
and nonemployment life.
(3) Medical causation requires proof that the physical,
mental, or emotional injury was medically caused by the
mental stress that is the legal cause of the physical, mental, or
emotional injury.

490

(4) Good faith employer personnel actions including disciplinary actions, work evaluations, job transfers, layoffs, demotions, promotions, terminations, or retirements, may not form
the basis of compensable mental stress claims under this
chapter.
(5) Alleged discrimination, harassment, or unfair labor
practices otherwise actionable at law may not form the basis of
compensable mental stress claims under this chapter.
(6) An employee who alleges a compensable industrial
accident involving mental stress bears the burden of proof to
establish legal and medical causation by a preponderance of
the evidence.
1997
34A-2-403. D e p e n d e n t s — Presumption.
(1) The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly
dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
(a) a child under 18 years of age, or over if the child is
physically or mentally incapacitated and dependent upon
the parent, with whom the child is living at the time of the
death of the parent, or who is legally bound for the child's
support; and
(b) for purposes of payments to be made under Subsection 34A-2-702(5)(a)(i), a surviving spouse with whom the
deceased employee lived at the time of the employee's
death.
(2) (a) In a case not provided for in Subsection (1), the
question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall be
determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing at the time of the injury or death of an
employee, except for purposes of dependency reviews
under Subsection 34A-2-702(5)(a)(iv).
(b) A person may not be considered as a dependent
unless that person is:
(i) a member of the family of the deceased employee;
(ii) the spouse of the deceased employee;
(iii) a lineal descendant or ancestor of the deceased
employee; or
(iv) brother or sister of the deceased employee.
(3) As used in this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act:
(a) "brother or sister" includes a half brother or sister;
and
(b) "child" includes:
(i) a posthumous child; or
(ii) a child legally adopted prior to the injury. 1997
34A-2-404. Injuries to minors.
(1) A minor is considered sui juris for the purposes of this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, and
no other person shall have any cause of action or right to
compensation for an injury to the minor employee.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), in the event of the
award of a lump sum of compensation to a minor employee,
the sum shall be paid only to the minor's legally appointed
guardian.
1997
34A-2-405. Employee injured outside state — Entitled
to compensation — Limitation of time.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), if an employee who
has been hired or is regularly employed in this state receives
personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment outside of this state, the employee, or the employee's dependents in case of the employee's death, shall be
entitled to compensation according to the law of this state.
(2) This section applies only to those injuries received by
the employee within six months after leaving this state, unless
prior to the expiration of the six-month period the employer
has filed with the division notice that the employer has elected
l907
to extend such coverage a greater period of time.
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
)BERT HIGGINS,

*

Applicant,
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

3UA MASSAGE, LLC
d HARTFORD/TWIN
TY FIRE INSURANCE,

*
*
Case No. 00-0807

Defendants.

*

Aqua Massage, LLC, and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Hartford / Twin City
re Insurance (jointly referred to as "Aqua") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review
iministrative Law Judge George's award of benefits to Robert Higgins under the Utah Workers'
Dmpensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Ann.).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
3de Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
On September 8, 2000, an Application For Hearing was filed with the Commission on Mr.
iggins' behalf to compel Aqua to pay workers' compensation benefits for injuries Mr. Higgins
istained in an automobile accident on August 1,2000. On June 11,2001, Judge George conducted
l evidentiary hearing on Mr. Higgins' claim, Then, on June 17, 2003, Judge George issued his
vision concluding that Mr. Higgins' injuries were work-related and therefore compensable under
e Act.
Aqua now requests Commission review of Judge George's decision. In its motion for
:view, Aqua argues that Mr. Higgins is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because his
juries are not work-related.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts Judge George's findings of fact, which can be summarized as
)llows.
On August 1,2000, Mr. Higgins was employed as assistant manager of Aqua Massage LLC,
small company that sells hydro-massage products from kiosks located in Fashion Place,
Cottonwood and Crossroads malls.
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)RDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
ROBERT HIGGINS
AGE 2
As assistant manager, Mr. Higgins was expected to take whatever action was necessary to
lake Aqua's retail operations run smoothly. He established employee work schedules and called
nployees from his home to verify they would report for work. From time to time, he worked at the
arious sales kiosks himself, as necessary to cover for absent employees. He collected employee
me cards, tracked inventory, and collected and deposited sales receipts.
Merchandise intended for sale at Aqua's kiosks was delivered to Mr. Higgins' home, where
was stored until needed. Mr. Higgins would then deliver the merchandise to the various kiosks,
qua provided Mr. Higgins with a computer at his home for use in scheduling and generating
ports. Mr. Higgins used his personal vehicle for his work-related travel. The company provided
m with a cell phone to maintain contact as he moved between his home and the various sales
cations.
Mr. Higgins customarily began work at his home at approximately 8 a.m. He would first
rform work on his computer, then call the employees scheduled to work that day. At about 9 a.m.,
would leave his home in the Tooele area and drive to one of Aqua's sales locations in the Salt
ke valley.
On August 1, 2000, Mr. Higgins was seriously injured in an automobile accident. Due to
uma from the accident, he cannot recall any of the events of that day. However, the evidence
ablishes that during the morning before the accident, he followed his regular work routine by
;ging on to his computer at home at 7:30 a.m., then driving to Fashion Place mall, where he
mned to work Aqua's sales kiosk. Mr. Higgins' accident occurred at 9:47 a.m., as he was
broaching the mall.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401(l) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides that "(e)ach
ployee... injured... by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment,
erever such injury occurred, . . . shall be paid compensation . . . and medical . . . expenses, as
vided by this chapter." It is undisputed that Mr. Higgins: 1) was employed by Aqua; 2) was
ired by accident on August 1, 2000; and 3) incurred medical expenses and suffered disability as
suit of his injury. Consequently, it is only necessary for Mr. Higgins to show by a preponderance
he evidence that his injury "arose out of and in the course o f his work for Aqua in order to
lify for the benefits provided by the Act.
In Buczvnski v. Industrial Commission, 934 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Utah App. 1997), the Utah
irt of Appeals discussed the meaning of the terms "arising out of employment" and "arising in
course of employment":
Under Utah law, an accident occurs "in the course" of employment when it
"occurs while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired
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to do or doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he
was authorized to render such service." M & K Corp. v. Industrial Common, 112
Utah 488 493,189 P.2d 132,134 (1948).
An accident arises out of employment "when there is a 'causal relationship'
between the injury and the employment." Commercial Carriers v. Industrial
Comm'n, 888 P.2d707,712 (UtahCt. App. 1994) (QuotingM&KCorp. 112 Utah
493,189 P.2d at 134), cert, denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). "'Arising out of,'"
however, does not mean that the accident must be "'caused by'" the employment;
rather the employment '"is thought of more as a condition out of which the event
arises than as the force producing the event in affirmative fashion.'" Commercial
Carriers, 888 P.2d at 712 (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation §6.60, at 3-9 (1994)) (emphasis in quoted treatise).
With respect to Mr. Higgins' claim, the Commission concludes that travel was an essential
art of Mr. Higgins' employment. It was Mr. Higgins' duty to transport merchandise from his home
) Aqua's sales locations, to travel between the sales locations, and to travel for other business
urposes such as depositing sales receipts. Mr. Higgins' work-related travel was, therefore, the
condition" out of which his accident and injury arose. Furthermore, Mr. Higgins' automobile
ccident occurred while he was rendering a service to his employer, or at the very least was engaged
n an activity that was necessarily incidental to his employment. In light of the foregoing, the
Commission concludes that Mr. Higgins' injury arose out of and in the course of his employment
it Aqua.
The Commission notes Aqua's argument that the "coming and going rule"1 should apply to
)ar Mr. Higgins' claim. However, the coming and going rule is inapplicable when the travel which
*ives rise to the accident is an integral part of the work itself. The Commission also notes Aqua's
irgument that an award of benefits in this case will require payment of workers' compensation
benefits in future cases whenever a worker has an accident while using a home compute, cell phone
or electronic calendar for any business-related purpose. Aqua's argument in this regard is
speculative. Rather than addressing hypothetical situations, the Commission must apply the wellestablished principles of Utah's workers' compensation law to the existing facts of Mr. Higgins'
present claim.

Professor Larson states the "coming and going rule" as follows:"... for an employee
having fixed hours and place of work, going to and from work is covered only on the
employer's premises. (Citations omitted.) See Larson's Workers' Compensation
Law, Vol. 1, §13.01.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

onr

3RDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
ROBERT HIGGINS
>AGE 4
In summary, the Commission concurs with Judge George's determination that Mr. Higgins
uffered injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment at Aqua and is,
herefore, entitled to workers' compensation benefits for those injuries.
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge George's decision and denies Aqua's motion for review. It
> so ordered.
Dated this [Q day of November, 2003.

Utah Labor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
consideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order,
lternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
view with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
*the date of this order.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iv-

)ER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
JERT HIGGINS
IE 5
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
ert Higgins, Case No. 00-0807, was mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ / d a y of
ember, 2003, to the following:
3ERT HIGGINS
\ RIVER ROAD #24
3EORGE UT 84790
UA MASSAGE LLC
SDOUGLAS ST#1
.T LAKE CITY UT 84102
RTFORD / TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE
i BOX 22815
NVER CO 80222
)AWN ATKIN, ATTORNEY
KIN & ASSOCIATES
. SOUTH STATE #380
LT LAKE CITY UT 84111
D KANELL, ATTORNEY
ANT WALLACE CHRISTENSEN & KANELL
5 SOUTH TEMPLE #1700
LT LAKE CITY UT 84111-1131
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N&Mid&ft^*
Sara Danielson
Support Specialist
Utah Labor Commission
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